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Purpose: To empirically investigate if credit rating changes have an impact on 
investment decisions of companies in the emerging markets, namely on investment 
and cash flow levels. 
 
Methodology:  Panel data regressions where the investment level, the change in the 
investment level and the cash flow level are the dependent variables, which are 
controlled by independent variables (besides credit rating change) such as leverage, 
profitability, firm size, GDP, inflation, interest rates.  
 
Theoretical perspectives: The theoretical framework consists of previous research 
on credit ratings and their impact on investment levels, as well as main theories such 
as tradeoff theory, pecking order theory and main issues connected to Credit Rating 
Agencies and the emerging markets. 
 
Empirical foundation: The study is based on Standard and Poor´s historic long-term 
issuer credit ratings and firms’ financials on a sample of 229 firms. The collected data 
covers a period from 2000 to 2012, amounting to a total of 1145 firm-years.  
 
Conclusions: The findings of this study suggest that downgrades have significant 
negative correlation to the cash flow level of firms. Overall, credit rating changes do 
not show any other major influence on the investment decisions of companies. 
However, firm size, interest rates, leverage, profitability and inflation have significant 
effects on the investment level of companies. Cash flow level seems to have 
consistent and significant influence on investment and this, together with the minor 
impact of credit rating changes, leads to the conclusion that companies in the 
emerging markets rely more on internal funds and Credit Rating Agencies seem to 
have less important role in these markets than the one they have in the developed 
markets.  
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1. Introduction  
 
1.1 Background to the study 
The main role for the Credit Rating Agencies (forthcoming abbreviated as CRAs) is 
to secure and guarantee companies’ or financial products’ creditworthiness, both from 
lenders’ and investors’ perspective (Champsaur, 2005).  There are several examples 
of scandals which have affected the reputation of CRAs: Worldcom or Enron, where 
CRAs rated the companies as “investment grade” just days before they went into 
bankruptcy; rating of the collateralised debt obligation (CDO) market (Jarrow & Xu, 
2010) and the current situation in some of the European countries. The European 
Central Bank implies that the downgrading of the sovereign credit rating of Greece 
has contributed to worsen the situation and to spread the problems to adjacent 
countries with weaker fiscal policy such as for example Ireland, Portugal, Italy and 
Spain (de Santis, 2012). All this has resulted in a debate regarding how trustful 
analyses from CRAs really are (Champsaur, 2005).  
 
“There are two superpowers in the world today in my opinion. There´s 
United States and there´s Moody´s Bond Rating Service. The United 
States can destroy you by dropping bombs, and Moody´s can destroy 
you by downgrading your bonds.” (Cane et. al., 2005: 1066) 
 
This quotation points out the important role that CRAs have had over the years and 
still have today in many aspects even though the above-mentioned criticism has 
damaged their reputation. The problems with CRAs involved in crises are not 
something new to the world. During the Asian crisis the CRAs got criticized for not 
responding to the economic situation and when they acted it was already too late 
(Löffler, 2002). CRAs were also blamed for failing to predict Mexico’s economic 
crisis in 1994-1995 and it became obvious that CRAs merely react to the economic 
situation rather than predict it (Larrain & Reisen, 1997). Moreover, Ferri, Liu and 
Stiglitz (1999) argue that CRAs tend to behave pro-cyclically, that is, upgrading when 
the financial conditions are good, and downgrading when the conditions are bad and 
thus they have worsen the pattern in the global financial markets. There are even 
some that believe that CRAs were not just a part of the economic crises during 2001-
2002 and in 2007-2008 but also contributed to the same by giving high credit ratings 
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without any deeper analysis (Voorhees, 2012). The following saying was quoted from 
Wall Street and presented in a report investigating the latest crisis in 2008 which the 
world has not fully recovered from:    
 
“Everything was investment grade. It didn´t really matter.” 
(Voorhees, 2012: 875)  
 
Even if CRAs’ role in the financial markets during the crisis is difficult to point out, 
despite many reports, they attract a lot of attention and highlight the weakness in the 
system and the importance of trust in the market. It is not just for investors and debt 
holders that the credit rating is important. Credit rating is the second highest concern 
for deciding the capital structure in a company (Kisgen, 2006). Kisgen found that 
CEOs put great trust in ratings when they decide the capital structure of a firm. The 
optimal level of debt and equity in a firm is central for value-maximizing in order to 
find the balance between costs (benefits) of external financing in the company. By 
taking credit rating into account, capital structure is affected by changes in ratings 
(Bo, 2008). A credit rating change affects the cost of capital of a firm and depending 
on whether it is an upgrade or downgrade, the firm would invest more (due to lower 
cost of capital) or less (due to higher cost of capital). That is why, credit ratings affect 
indirectly also the investment behavior of firms and this opens up for a not fully 
investigated area: how an up- or downgrading affects companies’ investment 
decisions. Gul et. al. (2009) presented the first evidence in this area, to our 
knowledge, when they concluded that firms have more capital investments after a 
credit rating upgrade and the other way around with downgrades. This underpins and 
enhances the quotation about CRAs as “superpowers” where a change in rating can 
affect the whole company. The two leading theories in capital structure are the 
pecking order theory and the tradeoff theory, which will be discussed further and used 
for the analysis. 
 
1.2 Previous research 
The following studies are examples of research done in similar areas with credit 
ratings. Klinger and Sarig (2000) focused on the information aspect and concluded 
that information of better- or worse-than-expected rating of bonds did not affect the 
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firm’s value when Moody’s announced it, but that the value of debt increased and a 
decrease in the value of equity was seen at the same time. Kisgen (2006) focused on 
the effect that credit ratings have upon firms´ capital structure decisions. The research 
was done in the US market with S&P´s long-term domestic issuer credit rating. 
Kisgen created a central hypothesis for his research referred to as Credit rating – 
capital structure hypothesis or “CR-CS”. The theory implies that a firm that is up- or 
downgraded will issue less debt compared to a firm not near a change in its rating 
(Kisgen, 2006). There is also research suggesting that firms or the management of a 
firm not always strive for a better rating since a higher grading is harder to sustain and 
that a potential downgrading is expensive (more expensive both in terms of cost of 
debt but also indirectly for managers’ and the firms’ reputation and the forthcoming 
business) (Bo, 2008). Kisgen (2006) found that credit ratings directly affect the capital 
structure of a firm. A firm near a change in the rating issued around one percent less 
net debt (of total assets) relative net equity annually compared to firms without any 
changes in their ratings. The decisions regarding capital structure were affected for 
both up- and downgrading. 
 
The same results with more capital investments in the time after an upgrade were 
concluded in a different study but with a similar method as Kisgen (Gul et. al., 2009). 
The authors formulated four hypotheses including up-and downgrading’s effect on 
investments, growth opportunities, shareholders’ impact on investments and the role 
of corporate governance in investment decisions. They found a positive relationship 
between upgrading and firm´s investments. Gul et. al. (2009) also found evidence for 
that a downgrading results in less investments the following years. Regarding the 
impact of agency problems they concluded that a higher level of agency problems 
resulted in less investments even though the firm had been upgraded. Furthermore, 
they found that better corporate governance negatively affected debt holders to the 
firm and in times with more investments from investors a firm would only react to an 
upgrade and the other way around with a downgrade. 
 
Bannier et. al. (2012) investigated the monitoring role of CRAs through credit ratings. 
They argue that firms reduce (raise) investment around negative (positive) rating 
events. The investment reaction is independent of changes in performance, investment 
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opportunities, capital costs or target ratings. They argue that the investment reaction is 
strongest for firms with high agency conflicts.  
 
Even though these studies are handling credit ratings, there is a great difference 
between them. Klinger and Sarig (2000) discussed bonds behavior after credit rating 
change, Kisgen (2006) focused more on how the capital structure is affected by a 
change in the rating, Gul et. al. (2009) looked at credit rating transitions and 
investment decisions of companies and Bannier et. al. (2012) investigated the 
monitoring role of CRAs. These studies and conclusions are focusing on similar 
objectives but there is nothing, to our knowledge, about the emerging markets and 
their investment behavior connected to credit rating transitions, which makes this area 
interesting for research and complementing to the conducted previous research.    
   
1.3. Aim and objectives 
There is not much research done outside the US market on the investment behavior 
after a credit rating change and therefore the need for further investigation is crucial. 
This is motivating from two perspectives: adding information to a relatively not 
investigated area but also in a comparing way between results from previous research 
in the US market and the following study on the emerging markets.  
 
The research on credit rating changes and investment decisions in the emerging 
markets is vital, since companies in these markets are less reliant on market debt (due 
to less accessibility to external financing) and agency costs are higher due to less 
transparency. Moreover, it is expected that CRAs have less impact on the companies 
in the emerging markets but as gatekeepers of the transparency in the markets, they 
have more job to do in the emerging markets. Therefore, the expectations from this 
research are that CRAs will have less influence on the investment decisions of 
companies in the emerging markets than the influence they have in developed 
markets.  
 
The aim of this paper is to investigate how an up- or downgrading affect company’s 
investment behavior in companies in emerging markets, which will be looked into 
through different key ratios presented in the methodology chapter. Previous studies 
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focused on the effects of the sovereign ratings on companies’ credit ratings in the 
emerging markets (Weigel & Gemmill, 2006). The research is also relevant from a 
time perspective since currently developing countries are the fastest growing markets 
in the world. Besides, it seems logical that companies in emerging markets face a lot 
of changes in their credit ratings, which makes this area of the world particularly 
intriguing to research in this context.  
 
1.4 Research question 
In order to investigate the correlation between up-/downgrading and investment 
decisions of companies, the following research questions are focused on in this study: 
 
 Do credit ratings influence the investment level of companies after the change 
in the rating? 
 Do credit ratings affect the changes in investment levels after up-/downgrade?  
 Do credit rating changes affect the cash flow levels of companies? 
 
A theoretical framework will be outlined to support the choice of these questions. A 
sample of companies in the emerging markets will be selected and credit rating and 
financial data will be collected. Furthermore, panel regression analysis will be 
conducted to investigate the correlation between credit rating changes and investment 
and cash flow levels.  
 
1.5 Scope and limitations  
The time frame of this study is focused on credit rating changes of companies in the 
emerging markets between 2000 and 2012. The sample includes 229 non-financial 
rated companies in the emerging markets. The used credit rating data is Standard and 
Poor’s foreign long-term rating. Local/national long-term ratings are not used since 
each national rating scale is unique and is designed to serve the specific needs of each 
local market (1.www.standardandpoors.com). Instead, the foreign long-term rating 
will make the companies in the sample more comparable to each other since the 
previous problems are excluded. Ratings from other CRAs such as Moody’s and Fitch 
are not taken into consideration due to lack of access to their credit ratings database. 
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The sample and the selection procedure will be described further in detail in chapter 
three, Methodology.  
 
The chosen time frame might not reflect the financial market and the investment 
grade in a perfect way due to the economic turbulence over the last years. Companies 
have probably done less investment even if their ratings remained constant in order 
not to be overoptimistic and risk ending up with future economic problems. Even 
though, there is a gain in this research in the updated information and also in the 
perspective that the time frame includes different economic cycles.   
 
1.6. Outline 
Chapter two covers the theoretical framework necessary for supporting the general 
overview of CRAs and the problems they face, the theories for financing rationale and 
emerging markets. Chapter three includes the methodology of the following research, 
describing the sample selection; defining variables, econometric techniques and 
regressions. Chapter four presents the results from the conducted tests. Chapter five 
elaborates the analysis of the results from the previous chapter. Chapter six concludes, 
followed by Reference list and Appendix. 
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2. Theoretical framework 
 
2.1. Credit Rating Agencies 
CRAs fill an important gap in sharing information for both investors and for debt 
holders. They aim to measure the creditworthiness, in other words companies’ ability 
to meet their debt obligations with a focus on the long-term view (Gonzales et. al., 
2004). Credit ratings are used for a number of different market participants such as 
nations, governments and companies for issuing debt (Frost, 2006), but only reflect 
the credit risk connected to the product/firm and do not cover other risks such as 
market – or liquidity risk (de Haan & Amtenbrink, 2011). 
 
The rationality of using CRAs is to reach information economies of scale and to 
increase the transparency among investors or debt holders. Some of the stronger 
arguments behind their position in the financial markets are that the ratings are based 
on information CRAs get from both public and non-public data, their employees and 
technological framework are highly skilled and they have the right incentives to judge 
a firm or product without any obligations against the issuer (Masciandaro, 2011). 
 
There are around 150 credit rating agencies in the world (de Haan & Amtenbrink, 
2011) but the market is totally dominated by three actors; Standard & Poor’s, 
Moody’s and Fitch with a combined market share over 90 percent (Tichy, 2011). The 
three big agencies (often mentioned as big three) use letters and figures for their 
ratings, expressed as a scale where, for example, the highest rating for Fitch and S&P 
is AAA, while the highest for Moody’s is Aaa. Credit ratings are separated in two 
categories: investment-grade and non-investment-grade (speculative). S&P’s ratings 
BBB and above are investment grade, while Moody’s puts the line between the two 
categories at Baa3 (IMF, 2010). This differentiation is essential for institutional 
investors since most of them have limitations on risk in their portfolios and are often 
obligated to invest in investment grade bonds. The letter assignment of ratings is 
depicted in detail in Table 1. 
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Table 1. Credit Rating Agencies’ Scales 
  
Source: Ganguin & Bilardello (2005), p. 186 
 
A high natural barrier for other companies to enter is one of the explanations of the 
low competition in the industry. The need of qualified analysts, well working 
methodologies and high credibility excludes many competitors since it takes years to 
reach high credibility and attract the best analysts in the area (Champsaur, 2005). This 
creates a “catch 22” where the market is excluding for just a few actors which have 
built credibility over the years. This situation creates a natural “monopoly” (or 
oligopoly), where the market is completely dominated by three major participants. 
 
The scandals in the last (roughly) ten years with for example Enron and Lehman 
Brothers have caused problems for the CRAs and their trustworthiness. Some argue 
that the information which the rating is based upon is not from first hand sources 
since the CRAs are slow to react and revise information and do not perfectly reflect 
the financial health of markets (Champsaur, 2005). CRAs also get criticized by having 
problems to attract the best people in the area due to the high competition in the 
financial market with better-paid work places as an alternative for the most talented 
ones. Finally, CRAs are scrutinized with the following quotation:   
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“…as with a hostage that eventually sympathizes with his or her 
captors, with close contact comes the potential for an issuer to cloud 
the judgment of a CRA” (Cane et. al., 2005: 1092) 
 
This is an example of an agent-principal conflict that might influence CRAs’ 
incentives, which will be discussed more in detail in Chapter 2.1.1. 
 
As a reflection of the massive critics of CRAs Cane et. al. (2005) argue for the 
freedom of speech protection where the agencies could be compared with newspapers 
or a meteorologist. They have the idea that CRAs serve the public with information 
about companies and financial products, but they are not something to build an 
investment decision upon. The problem with this view is that a CRA is paid by the 
issuer and can, if the grade is not favorable, just ask another agency to assign a rating. 
Compare this by using the metaphor with the weather forecast where a person cannot 
ask another meteorologist for better weather if they do not like the weather, nor does 
the meteorologist feel any obligations to report good weather (de Haan & 
Amtenbrink, 2011). This phenomenon is a potential market distinction between 
developed and emerging markets, where the customer does not necessarily pay for a 
security with the highest possible quality or accuracy.  It is therefore important for 
CRAs to have a high level of reliability both in the results from the rating but also in 
the rating process itself with independency as a demand (Champsaur, 2005).  
 
CRAs’ ratings are normally viewed from a medium term objective, and they signal in 
advance if a change in rating is upcoming by using “watch lists”. These lists cover a 
shorter view on around three months on average and are considered to be a quite 
strong indicator of a change in the rating (de Haan & Amtenbrink, 2011).  According 
to de Haan and Amtenbrink (2011), there are two main reasons for the 
implementation of watch lists: first, the higher demand for accurate information 
regarding the financial market and second, the direct contact with borrowing firms 
where the CRAs have a monitoring effect on the market. This is also something Boot 
et. al. (2006) highlight in their study where control is necessary for investors and their 
decisions. The reason for companies getting on the watch list is when CRAs notice 
differences in the firms´ characteristics which the rating is based on. Actions are often 
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required from the management of the firm to reach specific targets set by CRAs in 
order to maintain their rating. If they fail to perform in the questioned way to meet the 
targets the firm will be downgraded (Boot et. al., 2006).  
 
2.1.1. Agency issues 
The principal – agent conflict can occur, on one hand, between the CRAs and the 
issuer, and on the other hand, between the CRAs and investors. These kinds of 
conflicts arise from the fact that CRAs are paid by the companies (issuers of corporate 
bonds) rather than investors, who actually buy/trade with these bonds. It is also 
important to notice that CRAs’ revenues come mainly from rating fees (BIS, 2005). 
That is why; CRAs have the incentive to act in issuers’ interest by assigning a higher 
credit rating or considering downgrading more slowly than usual in order to give time 
for the company/issuer to avoid the unfavorable consequences of an eventual 
downgrading (e.g. – an increase in funding costs or to avoid triggering covenants) 
(Covitz & Harrison, 2003). CRAs refer to this as “migration policy” – the need to 
maintain ratings relatively stable, to make gradual changes and keep a track record of 
ratings in the markets and in this way, keeping agencies’ reputations (Gangiun & 
Bilardello, 2005). 
 
Covitz and Harrison (2003) investigate whether CRAs favor issuer interest (the 
“conflict of interest hypothesis”) or investor interests (the “reputation hypothesis”). 
CRAs may have the incentive to please issuers’ preferences because they have been 
approached and paid by these companies. Nevertheless, Covitz and Harrison (2003) 
argue that CRAs would not feel obligated to give favorable credit rating to companies 
which have chosen this particular agency since it is common for issuers to choose 
more than one agency to assign a rating for them (in order to increase their credibility 
among investors). They also believe that the “reputation hypothesis” dominates the 
incentives of CRAs. 
 
Having in mind the fact that agencies are keen on maintaining their reputation for the 
future for providing good services; this could be seen as disciplinary device to 
manage conflicts of interest (BIS, 2005). Furthermore, CRAs deal with conflicts of 
interest by making sure that analysts are not compensated on the basis of the ratings 
they assign and that they do not have any relationship with the company management 
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or business units’ staff. CRAs also try to diversify their revenues in order to be 
independent of any company that might try to influence its rating based on the 
eventual financial dependency. In addition, CRAs try to communicate better and more 
clearly how the conflicts of interest are managed within the agencies themselves and 
the issuing companies as well. 
 
The conflict that CRAs are paid by issuers and not by investors results from the fact 
that rating agencies cannot know in advance which investors are interested in the 
particular corporate bonds and even if they knew, these investors would not pay a part 
of the fee. In this sense, the issuer is actually the only one available for paying the fee. 
But this fact does not exclude the possibility that an issuer may try to use his 
bargaining power in order to get a better rating (Schwarcz, 2002).  
 
Investors rely on rating agencies for reassurance for the risks associated with 
investing in corporate bonds. However, CRAs are private companies and are not 
regulated by any major country or government. In this way, CRAs rate only the 
creditworthiness of the investment, not its economic relevance to the investors in 
question (Schwarcz, 2002). This is another potential conflict of interest that comes 
from the economic interest of a CRA in basing the credit rating only on the issuer’s 
creditworthiness, that is, credit ratings are based on the information CRAs get from 
the rated companies (Frost, 2006).  
  
Apart from the above discussed conflicts of interests, there is another conflict – the 
one with the CRAs’ goal of independence and objectivity to investors. Moreover, 
CRAs have been criticized that they lack independence, namely because of the 
reception of large fees for giving high ratings (Tett & Davis, 2007). The fact that 
CRAs also provide consulting services for a fee, may incur conflicts of interest as 
well. These consulting services may consist of purchasing “indicative” rating just 
before issuing an official public rating, accompanied by advice how to improve this 
eventual rating (Covitz & Harrison, 2003). 
 
The above mentioned criticisms on CRAs may lead to a conclusion that credit ratings 
do not have any use in companies’ investment decisions but this is not the case. Credit 
ratings could be biased, but the credit rating transitions (i.e. downgrading and 
16 
 
upgrading) could incur more credible results through the investment decisions 
perspective. The most common result is that there is an asymmetric effect of upgrades 
and downgrades, that is, investment level is more sensitive to downgrades (due to 
increased cost of capital), while upgrades do not incur significant impact on 
investment. This view is supported by Dichev and Piotroski (2001) and Goh and 
Ederington (1993). Credit rating down- or upgrades carry important information about 
the economic situation in a firm (Dichev & Piotroski, 2001). On the other hand, rating 
changes suggest wealth transfers from stockholders to bondholders in the case of 
downgrading which in its essence is one of the most important principal – agent 
conflicts (Goh & Ederington, 1993).  
 
2.1.2. Information asymmetry  
The logic for the existence of CRAs stems from one of the main imperfections of 
financial markets – the asymmetric information. CRAs act as intermediaries between 
investors/creditors and companies and provide each side with useful information for a 
final decision-making. Companies need credit ratings in order to get easy access to the 
global capital markets and increase their credibility among creditors. This need is also 
supported by the fact that investors prefer rated securities and are even often 
constrained to maintain only investment-grade bonds in their portfolios. CRAs supply 
market participants with a “system of relative creditworthiness”, that is, the credit 
rating. Nevertheless, the choice whether to invest in the rated companies or not, 
remains with the investors (Kräussl, 2003).  
 
Capital markets are not fully efficient since the information does not flow freely 
between investors and companies. This by itself may lead to underinvestment 
problems (Myers & Majluf, 1984). In other words, information asymmetry incurs 
financial constraints, which in turn imply that less investment than the optimal for a 
firm would occur. John and Nachman (1985) have concluded in their research that 
credit ratings decrease the levels of underinvestment. They argue that since reputation 
serves as a signal of firm quality, it helps to reduce information asymmetry. That is 
why, a firm with good reputation will invest more than it would if the good reputation 
was not present, thus reducing the underinvestment problem. Moreover, firms with 
good reputations also receive higher credit ratings and issue bonds at higher prices 
and thus they have more investment (John & Nachman, 1985). This could be also due 
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to the fact that firms with agency and information problems perform poorly and 
creditors can interfere with management and influence investment decisions (Chava & 
Roberts, 2008).   
 
CRAs rely on the information provided by the issuer. That is a reason why the rating 
itself is as reliable as the available information. Therefore, ratings do not cover the 
risk of fraudulent activities conducted by the rated company (Schwarcz, 2002). 
Another reason why the rating depends on the reputation of the CRA is the “private 
information hypothesis” developed by Gan (2004). It implies that companies with 
better private information self select and get higher ratings because of the private 
information they have disclosed to the rating agencies. Therefore, companies have the 
incentives to disclose information that puts them in a better position to get a higher 
rating but this information may be misleading as well. That is why, it is in the interest 
of companies to provide CRAs with all relevant private information as accurately and 
unbiased as possible in order to avoid future reputation downfalls.  
 
By applying too strict requirements to avoid downgrades, CRAs could restrict 
innovation in the market. It is also possible that the concentration in the credit rating 
industry could incur the same effects on the market. CRAs overcome information 
asymmetry problems by making their rating methodologies available to the market 
and in this way, they have increased the transparency of the rating process (BIS, 
2005).  In order for CRAs to decrease the amount of information asymmetry between 
companies and investors, they disclose their methodologies so that they are 
understood better by investors. Since CRAs act as third party providers of opinion, 
they are especially useful when the information costs for investors are relatively high.  
 
Kuhner (2001) focuses in his study on the question if CRAs have incentives to 
exaggerate the credit quality of a company during a systematic crisis. The essence of a 
systematic crisis lies in two main factors: first, investors do not have the ability to 
distinguish between good and bad debtors; second, investors tend to withdraw their 
investments. This situation also stems from the market imperfection of information 
asymmetry. 
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Overall, economically speaking, using ratings is rational and their growing 
“popularity” stems from their ability to provide information economies of scale by 
disclosing private information for companies through credit ratings and thus lowering 
the information asymmetries between investors and issuers and in turn, increasing 
companies’ reputations and consequently, their investment levels due to the higher 
prices of issued securities. 
 
2.1.3. Moral Hazard 
The natural continuity of the principal – agent and information asymmetry problems 
is the moral hazard issue that comes from the fact that management’s interests may 
not be aligned with shareholders’ interests and the investment activities do not 
maximize the firm value and may even destroy it if it is in the management’s interests 
(Jensen & Meckling, 1976). 
 
Having in mind the fact that there is no regulation on the quality of credit ratings, the 
informational value of the ratings depends on CRAs’ aim to maintain their reputation. 
But this cannot be an insurance of the correctness of ratings. Moral hazard exists due 
to the possibility that CRAs use the private information they have from their clients in 
their own interests and may misrepresent the credit quality of the company they are 
rating (Celjo-Hörhager & Niessen, 2006). 
 
When self-fulfilling interests are dominating, CRAs have the incentive to produce 
incorrect ratings. Depending on the degree of these interests, the rating agency gives a 
rating that either corresponds to the private information about the quality of the debtor 
or is incorrect. Based on this rating and other information, investors decide whether to 
invest or to withdraw their funds (Kuhner, 2001). 
 
However, even though the moral hazard of misrepresenting credit quality exists, it is 
unlikely that CRAs will abuse the private information they have since they have been 
quite cautious with their reputation among investors especially after the collapse of, 
for example, Worldcom and Enron. CRAs are also trying to regain the trust of 
investors after their inability to react adequately to the latest financial crisis from 
2007-2008 that was exaggerated by sudden massive downgrades and inaccurate risk 
19 
 
assessment. These factors support the unlikeliness of moral hazardous actions by 
CRAs.  
 
2.2. Theories of financing rationale 
2.2.1. Tradeoff theory 
The tradeoff theory supports the argument that a firm will find the balance between 
the benefits of debt and the potential bankruptcy costs to end up with an optimal level 
of leverage for the company. An important purpose of the theory is to explain the fact 
that companies are financed partly with debt and partly with equity. It states that there 
is an advantage to financing with debt (tax shields) and there are costs to financing 
with debt (costs of financial distress, bankruptcy costs). As leverage increases, there is 
a tradeoff between the interest tax shield and bankruptcy costs that causes an optimal 
capital structure (Kraus & Litzenberger, 1973). This is depicted by Figure 1. 
 
Figure 1. The tradeoff theory of capital structure  
 
Source: Ogden, Jen & O’Connor (2003), p. 73 
 
Looking at the information asymmetry problems through the lens of the tradeoff 
theory, Fama and French (2002) believe that they support the theory’s predictions 
about target leverage of companies and that the level of leverage is mean reverting. 
They also identify, as a conclusion, the negative relation between leverage and 
profitability under the tradeoff model. 
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In some cases, the costs that are incurred by a change in credit rating may evoke 
investment decisions with which the firm ends up with a totally different capital 
structure than the optimal one implied by the tradeoff theory, especially during 
downgrades (Kisgen, 2006). The argument is that if the rating-dependent costs 
(benefits) are material, managers will balance these costs (benefits) against the costs 
(benefits) implied by the tradeoff theory when making capital structure decisions. Due 
to the effect that credit ratings have on reputation, Kisgen (2006) argues that 
managers might aim at a level of debt that is not optimal for the firm but leads to a 
debt ratio that increases the chance of an upgrade and thus, capital structure decisions 
and investment decisions are dependent on credit rating changes. 
 
Furthermore, Graham’s survey results show that even though firms have 
predetermined leverage targets, following these targets is not of major importance for 
their management (Graham, 2000). This naturally leads to another major theory used 
to support the capital structure of companies, that is, the pecking order theory.   
 
2.2.2. Pecking order theory 
The pecking order theory implies that companies do not have predetermined capital 
structure and that firms make their investment decisions, as a result of information 
asymmetry, in the following order: use internal funds, then debt and finally, if the first 
two are too costly or unavailable, the firm would issue equity. Logically, the firm 
would issue debt when its projects with positive net present value exceed the amount 
of the internally generated funds and when the company has exhausted its debt 
capacity, it would issue equity to show to the market that its management is confident 
of the future and the investment opportunities (Myers & Majluf, 1984). 
 
The pecking order theory explains some agency issues such as the debt overhang 
problem (underinvestment) and the overinvestment problem. In theory, if debt creates 
potential underinvestment problems, the effect is neutralized by lowering the leverage 
level, if future growth opportunities are recognized early. Another possible agency 
problem is the “overinvestment” problem where the conflict is between management 
and shareholders. The argument is that managers have the incentive to expand the 
firm even if this means undertaking projects with negative net present value and thus 
reducing shareholder wealth. Jensen (1986) argues that managers of firms with large 
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free cash flows (FCFs) have the incentive to invest more (which may lead to 
overinvestment problems, empire building) and therefore bigger firms tend to have 
higher level of CF. Management could be restricted by the availability of free cash 
flow and increased debt financing. The issuance of debt pre-commits the firm to pay 
cash as interest and principal and thus forcing managers to service these obligations 
with funds that may have otherwise been used to finance poor investment projects. 
Therefore, leverage is one mechanism for overcoming overinvestment problems 
suggesting a negative relationship between debt and investment (Aivazian et. al., 
2005).  
 
According to Kisgen (2006), companies may face a tradeoff between equity issuance 
costs and the cost of eventual change in credit rating. This is in a contradiction with 
the pecking order theory, since if firms are close to an upgrade, they may issue equity 
instead of debt in order to keep their chances for a higher rating, while firms that are 
close to a downgrade would not issue debt just to avoid the higher costs associated 
with the downgrade, e.g. increased cost of capital (Kisgen, 2006). This contradiction 
also leads to the conclusion that firms with low leverage prefer and make large equity 
issues. This phenomenon is characterized as “one deep wound on the pecking order” 
(Fama & French, 2002). 
 
2.3. Emerging markets 
Emerging markets are often associated with rapid business growth and 
industrialization. According to Morgan Stanley Capital International (MSCI), the 
seven largest developing and emerging economies by nominal GDP are considered to 
be China, Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, Indonesia and Turkey (MSCI Emerging 
Markets, 2012).  Although these countries have the fastest-growing market for most 
products and services, many investors are reluctant to do business there, mainly due to 
the fact that they have access to less information about these markets and there is less 
presence of reliable intermediaries like CRAs, financial analysts and merchant banks 
(Palepu et. al., 2005). Following this line of thought, businesses there have less access 
to the creditworthiness of other firms and the corporate governance is also poor in the 
emerging markets. This leads to that generally emerging markets tend to be less 
transparent and more risky in the eyes of foreign investors.  
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Bekaert (1995) has identified some barriers to investment in the emerging markets 
such as: poor credit ratings, high inflation, the lack of good regulatory framework, the 
lack of sufficient country funds and the limited size of some stock markets. The 
increase of integration of these factors may lead to lower diversification benefits of 
investing in the emerging markets. This, in turn, may lead to reduced interest of 
international investors in the emerging markets. 
 
According to a study on the determinants of credit spreads in the emerging markets, 
spreads are determined not only by creditworthiness but also by global factors such as 
interest rates, S&P 500 returns, oil prices, etc. and this could lead to inadequate risk 
coverage. In addition, if there is an increase in the above mentioned global factors, the 
costs of financing in emerging market countries will rise even more, threatening the 
position of balance of payments (Kamin & Kleist, 1999). 
 
CRAs have a policy of never rating a company above the sovereign, the so called 
“sovereign ceiling”. Although CRAs claim that they have gradually moved away from 
this practice, it seems that sovereign ratings still remain an important factor of the 
credit ratings assigned to companies in these markets. Borensztein et. al. (2007) refers 
to this phenomenon as “sovereign ceiling lite”, that is, the sovereign credit rating is 
not an absolute constraint but can push down the corporate ratings. Therefore, the 
“sovereign ceiling” is close as a concept to the investment/speculative grade 
threshold. They also conclude that sovereign ratings may not capture adequately the 
corporate risk. According to S&P’s, the sovereign rating is a key consideration 
because governments in financial distress may force their private sector to go into 
default which is risky for investors (1. www.standardandpoors.com). That is why, the 
sovereign credit risk in emerging markets may constrain attracting new investment to 
companies that have in reality a reasonable credit risk and stable finances, which 
cannot be captured by their current credit rating due to the sovereign ceiling. 
 
The results of Kräussl’s empirical study (2003) show that CRAs have enormous 
influence on the size and volatility of emerging markets lending. A negative credit 
rating announcement might incur reconsiderations on institutional investors’ 
portfolios since they may be forced to reallocate their capital flows. Credit rating 
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changes may reveal new information about the company and may enhance financial 
market downturns. This effect is likely to be more significant in emerging markets 
due to more severe asymmetric information and transparency problems. 
 
Despite the above described difficulties, nowadays every leading company in the 
world introduces new business activities in emerging markets as part of their core 
strategy. Nevertheless, emerging market analysis has its own challenges such as 
inadequate market data, poor visibility on the regulations and government support and 
lack of reliable market research firms (Brechbuhl, 2006). The lack of transparency 
may evoke a more important role for CRAs in the emerging markets as participants 
who increase the trust between investors and companies in these markets. The above 
mentioned challenges would influence the following study as well but would make it 
more relevant in the context of the increasing pivotal future role of countries in the 
emerging markets.  
 
Companies in the emerging markets rely less on external financing because of the 
limited access to capital markets due to the higher risk investors see in financing these 
companies. CRAs are not so influential in the emerging markets and investors could 
not always rely that the company they want to invest in would be rated. That is why, it 
would be reasonable to expect that credit rating changes would not influence the 
investment decisions of companies in the emerging markets to the same extent as they 
do in the developed markets. On the other hand, rated companies in the emerging 
markets may appear to be more credible and reliable for foreign investors and thus 
credit rating changes could have greater impact than expected. Nevertheless, the 
questions whether the investment level in the emerging markets is influenced by 
changes in credit ratings or not and whether determinants of credit ratings or 
macroeconomic determinants have greater effects on investment, are yet to be 
revealed by conducting the following research. 
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3. Methodology  
 
3.1. Methodological approach  
The study in this research on the emerging markets and the investment pattern of 
companies after an up- or downgrading will be based upon the methodologies used in 
Gul et. al. (2009) and Bannier et. al. (2012). The emerging markets will be 
investigated with a similar approach as Gul et. al. (2009) in terms of their study on 
cash flows and ratings. Bannier et. al. (2012) study will be the base for defining the 
regressions that are going to be tested. Both studies will support the definition of the 
used variables. This together with existing research and presented theories will 
become the foundation for the following analysis.   
 
The event window of the study is two years pre- credit rating change and two years 
post the change. Adding the year of the rating change, the observations for each 
company are five, which lead to 1145 observations altogether. The choice of the five 
year period can be motivated by the fact that the study will observe the changes in the 
investment levels two years after the credit rating transition since the effects would 
not be simultaneous. The investment level in the years after the rating change will be 
compared to the investment level prior to the change. The event window of the study 
is depicted in the following figure: 
 
 
 
3.2. Sample and selection procedure 
The sample consists of rated companies in the emerging markets derived from the 
respective category in S&P’s Global Credit Portal (www.globalcreditportal.com). In 
order to avoid self-selection, data from S&P’s has been used since their credit ratings, 
together with Moody’s, are voluntary compared to the ones from Fitch (Gul et. al., 
2009). In order to create a comparable study for emerging markets and for 
generalization, S&P’s have been used instead of both S&P’s and Moody’s.  
 
By contacting S&P’s office in Stockholm, we obtained access to a free trial of the 
Global Credit Portal for a limited time so that the credit ratings could be collected.  
1                                 2                           rating change                         4                               5               
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The grading from S&P and the emerging markets is based upon different factors 
including macroeconomic factors, stability in the political life, legal rights, the 
conditions in trading processes and feedback from institutional investors (2. 
www.standardandpoors.com). 
 
The table below (Table 2) describes the process for how S&P divides countries into 
Frontier, Emerging or Developed countries. In the Initial Eligibility Criteria a country 
needs to fulfill all three criteria. In the second stage, Additional Criteria, the countries 
must at least meet three out of five criteria to be recognized as emerging countries. 
The difference between an emerging and a developed country is the final stage, where 
GDP (PPP) per capita is not greater than $15.000 (1. www.standardandpoors.com).   
 
Table 2. S&P country classification criteria 
 Frontier Emerging Developed 
 
Initial Eligibility Criteria 
Full domestic market capitalization of over $2.5bn 
Domestic turnover value of over $1bn 
Exchange development ratio of over 5% 
 
A minimum 
of two √ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
Additional Criteria 
Full domestic market capitalization of over $15bn 
Settlement period of T+3 or better 
Sovereign Debt rating of BB+ or above 
Non-occurrence of hyperinflation 
No significant foreign ownership restrictions 
Freely-traded foreign currency 
√ √ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
√ 
 
A minimum 
of three √ 
 
GDP Criterion 
GDP (PPP) per capita of greater than $15,000 √ 
Source: S&P Dow Jones Indices’ Country Classification Consultation, August 2012 
 
The initial sample in the category from S&P’s Global Credit Portal consisted of 744 
companies from different developing countries in the period 2000 – 2012. The sample 
includes only companies defined as “corporates” by S&P’s, that is, there are no 
financial institutions. Financial companies are excluded from the study since 
according to research, their capital structure may be completely different from that of 
the so-called corporate firms (Michelsen & Klein, 2011) and thus they are not 
comparable to industrial companies, for example. 
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The selection procedure consists of three steps: 
Step one: Companies without any changes in their credit ratings; the ones that have 
been put on a watch list, defaulted or are subsidiaries of other companies in the list, 
have been excluded from the initial sample.   
Step two: Companies for which there is no financial data in Datastream database or 
are not recognized as borrowers/issuers in the system are excluded. 
Step three: Companies with missing essential financial data for the period in 
Datastream database are excluded.  
 
3.2.1. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
Out of the initial 744 companies, 199 did not have changes in their credit rating 
during the chosen period, 82 were put on a watch list and no rated action was taken 
during the same period, 204 companies were downgraded, while 225 were upgraded, 
18 companies were subsidiaries of companies in the list. 14 companies defaulted 
within the period without having any changes in their rating. Still in the sample there 
are companies that might have defaulted but had more than one change in their rating 
before the default. The number distribution of the companies is shown in Figure 2.  
 
 Figure 2. Distribution of companies in the initial sample 
 
 
After Step one from the selection procedure, the sample was narrowed down to 429 
companies that have been either downgraded or upgraded in the study period. After 
searching for data from the financial statements of these companies in Datastream 
database (Step two), it turned out that 193 companies were not either recognized by 
No change; 
199
Upgrade; 
225
Downgrade; 
204
Watchlist ;
82
Defaulted; 
16
Subsidiaries; 
18
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the system or if so, there was no available financial data. The sample was narrowed 
down to 236 companies after Step two.  
 
Step three excluded seven more companies with missing key data that was necessary 
for the research. The final sample consists of 229 companies. Out of these 229 
companies, 92 were downgraded (40%) and 137 upgraded (60%). Steps two and three 
can be followed in Figure 3. Figure 4 represents the percentage proportion of up- and 
downgraded companies in the final sample. A full list of the selected companies is 
presented in Appendix 1.  
 
Figure 3. Step two and three  
     
               
Figure 4. Percentage proportion of final sample 
 
 
The companies in the sample are representatives from 32 countries from emerging 
markets all over the world. Moreover, the companies are spread over four continents. 
No data; 
193
Missing data;
7
Final sample; 
229
Upgrades 
60%
Downgrades
40%
Final sample
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The list of the countries and the number of companies from each country can be seen 
in Appendix 2, while the continent distinction is shown in Figure 5.  
 
Figure 5. Continent distinction of the companies 
 
 
3.3. Variables 
The use of book values for the selected variables, which were taken from the 
Datastream database, is done in order to be consistent with previous studies (e.g. 
Kisgen, 2006). Besides, CRAs assign their credit ratings assessing the risk through the 
book values of the variables they use in their methodologies (3. 
www.standardandpoors.com).  Moreover, Kisgen (2006) argues that the book value 
reflects managers’ decision-making better and more accurate. 
 
3.3.1. Dependent variables 
A dependent variable is what is measured in a test and what is affected during the test.  
The dependent variable “depends” on the independent variable(s) (Brooks, 2008). 
Since two of the research questions are if the credit rating transitions affect the 
investment decisions of companies, the dependent variable is the investment level of 
each company. The capital investment level in year t is calculated by dividing the 
capital expenditures (CAPEX) in year t by net property, plant and equipment (PPE) at 
the beginning of year t (Chava & Roberts, 2008).  
 
To answer the third research question, cash flows (CF) of companies are used as 
another dependent variable. CF is defined as a revenue or expense that changes a cash 
34%
3%
2%
61%
South America
Europé
Africa
Asia
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account over a period of time. CF arises from one of three activities – financing, 
operations or investing (Miller & VanHoose, 2003). For the purpose of this study, CF 
arising from investing has been taken into account. The choice of CF as dependent 
variable is motivated by the fact that firms need CF in order to complete their 
investment activities as a complement to other financing sources such as debt and 
equity. 
 
3.3.2. Explanatory variables  
Explanatory (independent) variables are variables that stand alone and are not affected 
by other measures. They are used to explain the behavior of the dependent variables 
(Brooks, 2008). Several variables are used to determine the dependent variable in this 
study that result in a multiple regression (a regression with more than one independent 
variable). Control variables and dummy variables are defined in order to make the 
study more reliable and accurate. 
 
3.3.2.1. Credit rating change variable 
This study will employ two approaches to present the credit rating change. The first 
approach to the credit ratings for the empirical analysis involves a linear 
transformation of the ratings from S&P’s into numbers, following the models of 
Kräussl (2006) and Afonso et. al. (2011), in order to capture the effect of the credit 
rating change. Afonso et. al. (2011) use a scale from 17 (AAA) to 1 (CCC+ to D), 
while Kräussl (2006) use a scale from 20 (AAA) to 0 (D). Therefore, a lower 
numerical score corresponds to a lower credit rating or higher credit risk (Afonso et. 
al., 2011). Since most of the companies in the current sample are below investment 
grade, Kräussl’s scale would depict in more detail the credit ratings and would make 
the results more reliable. That is why, the empirical analysis will be based on the 
second mentioned scale, which is shown in Table 3. The numerical scores from 0 to 
10 correspond to the speculative grade, while the scores from 11 to 20 correspond to 
the investment grade.  
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Table 3. Linear transformation of credit ratings into numerical scores 
 
Source: Kräussl (2006), p. 28 
 
The second approach to credit rating change is to include a credit rating dummy. This 
process will be explained in detail under Chapter 3.3.2.3. a).  
 
3.3.2.2. Control variables 
Control variables are constant and test the relative impact of independent variables 
(Brooks, 2008). By including several control variables it is possible to control for 
firm-specific factors. Kisgen (2006) defines in his study that the dominant 
determinants of credit ratings are firm size, profitability and leverage. Consequently, 
this model is followed and these three determinants as control variables are used in 
this study, adding a fourth one, that is, cash flow as a determinant of investment level. 
The variables are determined as follows: 
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 Leverage is defined by the ratio Debt/Total capitalization. A higher leverage 
level is expected to relate to more conservative investment decisions despite 
the rating changes since companies and management would employ more 
conservative financing policies in order to avoid increased probability of 
financial distress and bankruptcy in the future.  
 
 Profitability (or return on assets – RoA) is defined as firm’s earnings before 
interest, taxes, depreciation and amortization (EBITDA) divided by total 
assets at the beginning of the year. Companies in the emerging markets face a 
lot of challenges in terms of financing investment activities and paying down 
debt. That is why, profitability is an important control variable since it 
indicates how effective a company is in using its assets to generate earnings 
before debt obligations must be paid down.  
 
 Firm size is defined by the natural logarithm of total assets. When taken, the 
logarithm value of total assets makes the variable comparable to the other 
variables, which are ratios. According to Gul et. al. (2009), the firm size could 
be a proxy for agency problems and therefore the sign should be mixed. That 
is, when size is a proxy for capital raising ability, the sign should be positive; 
when size is a proxy of maturity, the sign should be negative. 
 
 Cash flow (CF) variable is collected from Datastream, the category: net cash 
flow – investing. This item reports the aggregate change in the company’s cash 
position that results from any gains (losses) from investment and changes that 
result from spending on investment in capital assets such as property, plant 
and equipment (PPE). The natural logarithm of CF is taken into account in the 
study as a control variable and a determinant of the investment level of a 
company (Gul et. al., 2009).   
 
A control for the differences between the different countries in the sample is also 
conducted. The control variables are gross domestic product (GDP), inflation and 
interest rates for each country in the study period. The rationale for choosing these 
factors is as follows: 
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 GDP is one of the main indicators of the health of a country’s economy. It 
represents the total value of all goods and services produced in a country over 
a specific time period. The equation GDP = C + I + G + NX from 
macroeconomics (C – consumer spending, I – sum of all businesses spending 
on capital, G – the sum of government spending, NX – net export, or total 
exports minus total imports) shows that investment level of companies is quite 
important for the GDP. If there is low investment level, there will be lower 
GDP and the other way around (Miller & VanHoose, 2003). 
 
 Inflation is an indicator of how well a country manages its monetary policy. 
High inflation rates may indicate inconsiderate policies, such as excessive 
borrowing and thus a higher probability of default (Weigel & Gemmill, 2006). 
Inflation is defined as the rate at which the general level of prices for goods 
and services is rising, and thus, the purchasing power is falling, which results 
in paying more across time to acquire the same goods and services. This is a 
situation where the demand for goods and services exceeds their supply in the 
economy. Inflation makes it harder for businesses to plan for the future. 
Inflation causes uncertainty about future prices, interest and exchange rates 
and thus increases the risk among potential trade partners (Miller & 
VanHoose, 2003). 
 
 Interest rates – higher interest rates increase the burdens of a debt service, 
decreasing the ability to pay and thus increasing the possibility of default  
(Weigel & Gemmill, 2006). Interest rates in the emerging markets are high 
(compared to those in the developed world, which are very low, near-zero in 
nominal terms and negative in real terms (Dimson et. al., 2012)) due to the 
higher credit risk and uncertainty in servicing debt obligations (e.g. the 
average interest rate in the sample of this study is 7.06%).  
 
3.3.2.3. Dummy variables 
Dummy variables take the value of either one or zero, indicating the presence or the 
absence of a particular quality (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The dummy variables are 
used as explanatory variables and their coefficients can be interpreted as the average 
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differences in the values of the dependent variable (Brooks, 2008). The definition of 
four dummy variables is explained in the following sections.  
 
a) Credit rating dummy  
The approach to the credit rating dummy is to separate between upgrades and 
downgrades in order to investigate which credit rating action influences to a greater 
extent the investment level of companies. The upgrade dummy assigns zero to the 
years with downgrade and without any change in the credit rating and one to the years 
with an upgrade. The downgrade dummy assigns the value of one to the years with 
downgrade in the credit rating and the value of zero when there is no change or an 
upgrade. 
 
b) Industry dummy 
The main industries represented in the sample are electric, energy and telecom 
services. The industry dummy is defined as one for companies in the electric and the 
energy sector and zero for companies in the telecom services and any other industry 
with minority representation (e.g. media and entertainment).  
 
c) Country dummy 
There are 32 countries in the final sample. In order to control for potential differences 
in regulations and accounting standards, a country dummy variable is employed. An 
alignment of the countries is done by continents. Since companies from Asia 
dominate the sample, the dummy variable is equal to one for companies from this 
continent and zero for all of the companies outside Asia.   
 
d) Cross-section fixed and period fixed dummy variables 
Since the data varies between the different companies (cross-section) and within the 
period from 2000 to 2012, a fixed effect model is conducted to control for residual 
values that may otherwise distort the results. The use of cross-section and period fixed 
dummy variables is defined by running Fixed/ Random effects testing/ Redundant 
fixed effects – likelihood ratio in EViews. If the cross-section/period F and Chi-
square are significant, these dummy variables are included in the regression and if 
they are not significant, they are excluded from the regression and industry and 
country dummy variables are included instead.  
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3.4. Econometric techniques 
Several multiple regressions will be run in order to empirically examine the main 
research questions of this study. A multiple regression analyzes the relationship 
between one variable (the dependent variable) and a set of other variables (the 
independent variables or explanatory variables). The objective is to explain the 
behavior of the dependent variable in relation to the behavior of the independent 
variables (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The data in the sample is both cross-sectional and 
time-series, where the time-series data refers to the time period in the sample, that is, 
between 2000 and 2012, while the cross-section refers to the width of the data, which 
in the case is the 229 firms included. That is why, panel data will be employed to 
combine both the time-series and cross-section data types. The panel data analysis is 
based on the data in the sample over the whole analyzed period of the investigated 
years.   
 
The method of Ordinary Least Squares (OLS), as the most frequently used method in 
regression analysis (Gujarati & Porter, 2010), is used to estimate the regression 
models and investigate the linear relationship between the dependent and the 
explanatory variables. OLS estimators are Best Linear Unbiased Estimators (BLUE), 
which is why this method has minimum variance (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). The OLS 
method will be run through the econometrics software program EViews 7.  
 
3.5. Regressions  
Following the methodology of Bannier et. al. (2012), the base empirical model is as 
follows: 
Investmentit= α0 + β0Ratingchangeit-1 + β1Xit-1 + ηi +µt + εit 
 
Here, Investmentit is the investment level of the company measured by the ratio 
CAPEX/PPE, Ratingchangeit-1 is a vector of variables measured in two different ways 
(described in Chapters 3.3.2.1 and 3.3.2.3.a), Xit-1 is a vector of control variables, ηi is 
a firm fixed effect, µt is a period fixed effect and εit is a random error term. The 
parameter of interest is β0. It measures the effect of credit rating downgrades or 
upgrades on the firm’s investment level. Since firm-specific fixed effects are 
included, the identification of β0 is based on those firms that experience a rating 
35 
 
change (Bannier et. al., 2012). The above mentioned variables were defined and 
explained in more detail in the Chapter 3.3. 
 
Based on the above mentioned empirical model, the following regressions are 
defined: 
1. Investmentit= α0 + β0Rating change (numeric) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + 
β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit 
This basic equation aims at understanding which variable influences the most the 
investment level of companies in the emerging markets. The rating change here is 
presented by the difference in the numeric credit rating of each company from one 
year to the next.  
2. Investmentit= α0 + β0Upgrade dummy +γ0Downgrade dummy + β1Leverage + 
β2RoA + β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate  + ηi 
+µt + εit 
This equation is a variation of the previous one but here the rating change is 
represented by credit rating dummies for upgrades and downgrades, aiming at 
extracting more accurate results from the actual change of the credit ratings and 
comparing them to previous studies that follow the same logic for defining the credit 
rating change.  
3. Investmentit= α0 + β0 Lag(Rating change (numeric)) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + 
β3Firmsize + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate  + ηi +µt + εit 
The equation uses the numeric change in the credit ratings which is lagged in order to 
see what the influence of the change is one year after the change itself since it is likely 
that the change will not have simultaneous effect on the investment level of a 
company. 
4. Investmentit= α0 + β0Lag(Upgrade dummy) +γ0Lag(Downgrade dummy) + 
β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firmsize + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interet 
rate + ηi +µt + εit 
The equation tests the same effects as Equation three, but uses the rating change 
dummies instead of the numeric change of the credit rating. 
5. ∆Investmentit= α0 + β0Rating change (numeric) + β1∆Leverage + β2∆RoA + 
β3∆Firm size + β4∆CF + β5∆Inflation + β6∆GDP + β7∆Interest rate + β8 
Industry dummy+ β9 Country dummy+ β10 Relative year + εit 
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This equation tests the effect of the rating change (numeric credit rating) on the 
change of the investment level of companies. The change of investment rate is also 
controlled by the change in the independent variables. Here are added variables for 
industry, country and year to control for differences between the various companies in 
the sample. 
6. ∆Investmentit= α0 + β0Upgrade dummy + γ0Downgrade dummy + 
β1∆Leverage + β2∆RoA + β3∆Firm size + β4∆CF + β5∆Inflation + β6∆GDP + 
β7∆Interest rate + β8 Industry dummy+ β9 Country dummy+ β10 Relative year 
+ εit 
The equation is a variation of Equation five, but this one uses the credit rating 
dummies in order to compare the different results from these two equations, checking 
which rating variable incurs more significant results. 
7. CFit= α0 + β0Rating change (numeric) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firm size + 
β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit 
The equation investigates the relationship between credit rating change (numeric) and 
the CF available for investment, controlling for determinants of the credit rating and 
country-specific variables. 
8. CFit= α0 + β0Upgrade dummy + γ0Downgrade dummy + β1Leverage + β2RoA 
+ β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit 
This is a variation of Equation seven using the rating change dummies in order to 
show the differences of the different approaches towards the definitions of credit 
rating change. 
 
3.5.1. Regression assumptions 
The regression models in this study must meet some assumptions to be considered 
reliable. The assumptions of the classical linear regression model must be fulfilled to 
show that the OLS estimation fulfills its desirable properties (BLUE) (Brooks, 2008).  
The assumptions of OLS are: 
 There is no correlation between the error term and any independent variable – 
needed to obtain unbiased estimates of regression coefficients. This 
assumption will be controlled for with correlation matrix in EViews (Gujarati 
& Porter, 2010).  The correlation matrix can be seen in Appendix 3.  
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 Homoscedasticity – that is constant variance of the error term associated with 
cross-sectional data; will be controlled by using White heteroscedasticity – 
corrected standard errors for all regressions. This is done to obtain efficiency 
in the OLS estimators, that is, they have a minimum variance and thus 
generate optimal results. If this assumption is not met, the standard error 
could be wrong and may cause incorrect statistical conclusion (Brooks, 2008).  
 There is no exact co-linearity between the independent variables – that is, no 
linear relationship between the independent variables in the regression. This 
will be controlled by a correlation matrix. Correlation values greater than 0.8 
indicate co-linearity and if there is such a case the regression model should be 
reconsidered (Gujarati & Porter, 2010). (Also see Appendix 3) 
 
3.6. Reliability and validity 
Reliability is making sure that temporary or random differences in the sample do not 
influence the results. It is also about producing data in a consistent way over similar 
samples and anyone following the outlined steps should be able to replicate the same 
results or findings (Bryman & Bell, 2007). 
 
For gathering the credit ratings of the firms, S&P’s Global Credit Portal was used. 
Since S&P’s is one of the three biggest CRAs and most companies are rated by either 
S&P’s or Moody’s, the credit portal is a reliable and accurate source of current and 
historical credit ratings. For collecting the firm-specific financial data, the Datastream 
database was used. Since Datastream is widely used by academic researchers in the 
finance field as well as by finance practitioners, it is considered a reliable database. 
The data from Datastream is derived from the annual reports of each company, which 
means that the data has been audited and approved. Therefore, the data collected is of 
high reliability. Nevertheless, the reliability of this study has been additionally 
strengthened. First, the sample period is between the years 2000 and 2012 aiming at 
the availability of more data and minimizing the risk of irregular or temporary errors 
in the data. Second, the selection procedure of the sample was clearly stated and 
outlined and can be easily replicated in future research.  
 
Validity is considered in terms of whether the used method measures what it is 
supposed to measure (Bryman & Bell, 2007). Since this study follows the base model 
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from Bannier et. al. (2012), it can be concluded that the following study measures 
what it is supposed to.  
 
There is a distinction between internal and external validity (Lundahl & Skärvad, 
1999). Internal validity refers to whether there is a causal relationship between the 
measured variables. The internal validity of this study has been strengthened by 
concentrating on non-financial firms in the sample, since the investment decisions of 
financial firms differ from non-financial firms. Besides, firm-specific factors have 
been controlled for by including control variables. Moreover, the effects of business 
or credit cycles have been mitigated by using long-term credit ratings.  
 
External validity refers to whether the results of a test are generalized. The countries 
in the sample are representative of the emerging markets. It is still difficult to 
generalize results because of differences in laws and regulations and access to debt 
and equity capital. These differences must be taken into account before generalizing 
the results to other geographical regions. That is why, in order to minimize such 
external effects, year and country dummy variables have been included to take into 
account differences in the time period and differences between the countries in the 
sample.  
 
  
39 
 
4. Results 
4.1. Descriptive results 
Table 4 below presents a summary of the statistics of the sample for the major 
variables included in the study. The median numeric credit rating in the sample is 
nine, which is equivalent to a rating of BB and this is an indicator that most of the 
companies in the sample are below investment grade. The minimum and maximum 
values of the numeric credit ratings also show that there is at least one company that is 
rated D (0) or AAA (20). The statistics show that the variables vary a lot in terms of 
minimum and maximum values, which supports the use of cross-section and period 
fixed dummy variables. 
 
Table 4. Descriptive statistics of the sample 
  Median Std.dev. Min Max 
Numeric rating 9 3.6832 0 20 
Capex/PPE 0.1511 0.1730 0 2.1746 
Profitability 0.1421 0.2054 -2.0412 4.8303 
Leverage 0.4205 0.6444 7.9020 10.4572 
Firm size 7.6366 1.2058 4.5574 11.0209 
Inflation 4.69 17.2928 -4.86 130.25 
GDP 1229133 5548945 -273.9 51116533 
Interest rates 2178.9 6.2627 0.46 101.625 
 
4.2. Regression results 
After running the regression from Equation 1, that is: Investmentit= α0 + β0Rating 
change (numeric) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + 
β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit, it turns out that the most significant 
determinants of the investment level in a company are its CF and its size. The 
correlation between the CF and the investment level is positive, resulting in the 
conclusion that the more CF a firm has, the more it invests. The second most 
significant variable is the size of the firm, but it is negatively correlated to the 
investment level, which means that the smaller the firm (less assets), the more 
investment it has.  
 
Although the p-values of GDP and profitability (0.3466 and 0.3847 respectively) are 
not significant, they influence the investment level to a greater extent than the rest of 
the variables (excluding the already described ones), since GDP is an indicator of the 
profitability of the economy of the specific country and the EBITDA/Total assets ratio 
is an indicator of the profitability of the companies in question. Their p-values are 
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close to each other, leading to the assumption that the profitability of both the 
economy and the company more or less equally influence the investment level of 
companies. The empirical results are shown in Table 5. 
 
The results in Table 6 from Equation 2: Investmentit= α0 + β0Upgrade dummy 
+γ0Downgrade dummy + β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + 
β6GDP + β7Interest rate  + ηi +µt + εit show a significant result in that a firm with 
greater cash flow invests more compared to the ones with less cash flow. The second 
significant variable is the firm size. This outcome has a high explanatory grade in the 
probability but is negatively correlated. These two results are consistent with the 
results from Equation 1.  
 
However, the different approach to the credit rating change presentation incurs 
significance in more independent variables. The test presents results for that the 
inflation in the specific country affects the investment rate of a company. The 
relationship is positive which means that higher inflation incurs higher investment. 
Finally, the leverage level is also significant (p-value of 0.1230) but to a smaller 
extent. The leverage is negatively correlated to the investment level, that is, the higher 
the leverage, the smaller the investment level. This result can be seen from the 
outcomes in Equation 5 and Equation 6 as well. Although the effect of the credit 
rating change is not significant, it becomes clear that the rating upgrade positively 
influences to a greater extent the investment level compared to the rating downgrade. 
 
Table 5. Equation 1 – results 
Observations: 713 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C 0.119751 0.290452 0.6803 
Rating change -0.000396 0.004424 0.9288 
Leverage 0.004248 0.010101 0.6743 
Profitability 0.037204 0.042759 0.3847 
Size -0.075564 0.039021 0.0534** 
CF 0.100717 0.012325 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.000878 0.001320 0.5062 
GDP -8.89E-09 9.44E-09 0.3466 
IR 0.000150 0.001068 0.8882 
R-squared 0.791796 F-statistic 7.670426 
Adj. R-squared 0.688569 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
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Table 6. Equation 2 – results 
Observations: 878 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C 0.046698 0.304429 0.8781 
Upgrade 0.016643 0.017316 0.3369 
Downgrade -0.000797 0.018740 0.9661 
Leverage -0.015010 0.009720 0.1230 
Profitability -0.029338 0.025273 0.2461 
Size -0.078683 0.040027 0.0498** 
CF 0.107983 0.012730 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.002558 0.001409 0.0698** 
GDP 7.09E-09 1.02E-08 0.4854 
IR -0.000437 0.001256 0.7282 
R-squared 0.661110 F-statistic 5.207602 
Adj. R-squared 0.534159 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
Equation 3 aimed at the lagged effects of the credit rating change, that is, 
Investmentit= α0 + β0 Lag(Rating change (numeric)) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + 
β3Firmsize + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit . The CF 
remains the most significant determinant of the investment level of companies with 
still a positive correlation but a slight difference in the slope. Compared with the 
results from Equation 1, the lagged rating change makes the size of the firm 
insignificant which may lead to the conclusion that no matter what the size of the firm 
is, small and large companies respond in the same way to credit rating change in their 
investment decisions. The results are depicted in Table 7. 
 
The result of Equation 4, Investmentit= α0 +β0Lag(Upgrade dummy) 
+γ0Lag(Downgrade dummy) + β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firmsize + β4CF + 
β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interet rate + ηi +µt + εit is shown in Table 8. The lagged 
rating change presented as dummy variables exerts more effects than the lagged rating 
change presented in numeric credit ratings (probably due to the larger number of 
observations taken into consideration). The CF is still a significant determinant of the 
investment level of a company. What is different in the results from this equation is 
that the size of the firm is also significant (still negatively correlated). Unlike the 
results from Equation 2, here the lag in both upgrades and downgrades is negatively 
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correlated to the investment level, and downgrades seem to have a more significant 
effect than upgrades. 
 
Table 7. Equation 3 – results 
Observations: 531 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -0.290953 0.386749 0.4525 
Rating change (Lag) -0.003430 0.004632 0.4596 
Leverage 0.006450 0.011802 0.5851 
Profitability 0.036816 0.048795 0.4511 
Size -0.022824 0.051918 0.6605 
CF 0.097254 0.016009 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.000617 0.001792 0.7309 
GDP -3.10E-09 1.23E-08 0.8022 
IR -0.000248 0.001072 0.8172 
R-squared 0.857070 F-statistic 7.821408 
Adj. R-squared 0.747490 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
Table 8. Equation 4 – results 
Observations: 713 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C 0.121682 0.290247 0.6752 
Upgrade (Lag) -0.013215 0.015748 0.4018 
Downgrade (Lag) -0.021539 0.016933 0.2040 
Leverage 0.004357 0.010092 0.6661 
Profitability 0.033773 0.042743 0.4298 
Size -0.074206 0.039000 0.0577** 
CF 0.099964 0.012358 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.000906 0.001327 0.4952 
GDP -8.62E-09 9.45E-09 0.3623 
IR 0.000113 0.001063 0.9152 
R-squared 0.792500 F-statistic 7.654672 
Adj. R-squared 0.688969 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
The results from Equation 5, ∆Investmentit= α0 + β0Rating change (numeric) + 
β1∆Leverage + β2∆RoA + β3∆Firm size + β4∆CF + β5∆Inflation + β6∆GDP + 
β7∆Interest rate + β8 Industry dummy+ β9 Country dummy+ β10 Relative year + εit, 
show strong significance of the change of CF level, which is positively correlated 
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with the change in investment level. This means that the greater the change in CF, the 
greater the change in investment level will be, that is, less CF leads to less investment. 
The change in inflation is also important for the change in the investment level, which 
is also positively related. The results show that the change in leverage of the firm is 
important determinant of the change in the level of investment after a credit rating 
transition. The correlation is negative, which means that the greater the change in 
leverage is, the less the change in the investment level will be. This seems logical 
since when a company takes on more debt, it would restrict its investment activities in 
order to be able to service its debt obligations and avoid the probability of financial 
distress and bankruptcy.  
 
Altogether there are few results with clear significance at the highest level, which can 
be observed in the R-squared test where there is just 13 percent of the variability that 
is explained by the dependent variables. The test is done without any correction with 
cross-section fixed and period fixed dummies since the result is robust without them. 
The results can be seen in Table 9.    
 
The test in Table 10 is done with the change in investment level as dependent variable 
and the rating transition is presented as dummy variables: ∆Investmentit= α0 + 
β0Upgrade dummy + γ0Downgrade dummy + β1∆Leverage + β2∆RoA + β3∆Firm size 
+ β4∆CF + β5∆Inflation + β6∆GDP + β7∆Interest rate + β8 Industry dummy+ β9 
Country dummy+ β10 Relative year + εit. The test is also done without any correction 
with cross-section fixed and period fixed dummies since the result is robust without 
them. This test incurs similar results as those from Equation 5, showing that the 
changes in CF level, inflation and leverage are important for the change in investment 
level of a company. This leads to that in terms of the change in investment level, there 
is no difference in the results in the way the credit rating change is presented and that 
of all the independent variables, the CF and leverage levels have exactly the same 
explanatory power to the change in the investment level. Upgrades and downgrades 
have positive relation to the change in the investment level and downgrades incur 
more significant effects than upgrades. 
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Table 9. Equation 5 – results 
Observations: 626 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -0.020667 0.019575 0.2915 
Rating change  0.001920 0.005831 0.7420 
∆Leverage -0.024672 0.010119 0.0150*** 
∆Profitability -0.012840 0.025545 0.6154 
∆Size -0.023030 0.048377 0.6342 
∆CF 0.103645 0.012116 0.0000*** 
∆Inflation 0.004370 0.001701 0.0104*** 
∆GDP 9.44E-09 1.57E-08 0.5476 
∆IR -0.002578 0.002010 0.2001 
Industry -2.14E-05 0.010495 0.9984 
Country 0.004058 0.010963 0.7114 
Relative year 0.002014 0.004698 0.6683 
R-squared 0.130478 F-statistic 8.375942 
Adj. R-squared 0.114901 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
Table 10. Equation 6 – results 
Observations: 626 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -0.016242 0.020239 0.4226 
Upgrade 0.012991 0.018722 0.4880 
Downgrade 0.018095 0.019278 0.3483 
∆Leverage -0.024651 0.010106 0.0150*** 
∆Profitability -0.013687 0.025568 0.5926 
∆Size -0.024131 0.048390 0.6182 
∆CF 0.103743 0.012118 0.0000*** 
∆Inflation 0.004517 0.001711 0.0085*** 
∆GDP 9.26E-09 1.57E-08 0.5552 
∆IR -0.002768 0.002021 0.1712 
Industry -0.000518 0.010507 0.9607 
Country 0.004259 0.010963 0.6978 
Relative year -0.002405 0.007099 0.7349 
R-squared 0.131584 F-statistic 7.740228 
Adj. R-squared 0.114584 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
The results from Equation 7, CFit= α0 + β0Rating change (numeric) + β1Leverage + 
β2RoA + β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt+ εit, 
45 
 
indicate a significant positive relationship between the size of the firm and its CF 
available for investing. This result is in line with the results of Gul et. al. (2009), who 
concluded that firms with higher CF and lower growth opportunities (that is large 
firms) adjust their investment less. The overall results are depicted in Table 11.  
 
The test in Table 12 is based upon Equation 8: CFit= α0 + β0Upgrade dummy + 
γ0Downgrade dummy + β1Leverage + β2RoA + β3Firm size + β4CF + β5Inflation + 
β6GDP + β7Interest rate + ηi +µt + εit. Credit rating downgrade is significant (about 
90 percent significance) independent variable with a negative correlation to CF level, 
that is, the more a firm is downgraded, the less CF available for investing the firm will 
have. The size of a firm is significant, similar to the result from Equation 7, which 
once again supports the fact that this result is in line with the results from Gul et. al. 
(2009).  Secondly, there is a high level of significance in that firms with higher 
profitability (EBITDA/Total assets) have a better cash flow available for investment. 
The interest rate of the specific countries is also significant, with a negative 
correlation to the level of CF in the firm, which means that the higher the interest rate, 
the smaller amount of CF for investing a firm will have. 
 
Table 11. Equation 7 – results 
Observations: 713 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -2.441885 1.073190 0.0233 
Rating change  -0.016697 0.016416 0.3096 
Leverage 0.037188 0.037487 0.3217 
Profitability -0.178947 0.158635 0.2599 
Size 1.151524 0.135030 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.004788 0.004898 0.3288 
GDP 2.78E-08 3.50E-08 0.4272 
IR -0.004963 0.003961 0.2109 
R-squared 0.967697 F-statistic 60.80555 
Adj. R-squared 0.951782 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
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Table 12. Equation 8 – results 
Observations: 713 
Variable Coefficient Std. Error Prob. 
C -0.993138 0.945239 0.2938 
Upgrade  0.042789 0.053787 0.4266 
Downgrade  -0.093971 0.058118 0.1064* 
Leverage 0.003934 0.030207 0.8964 
Profitability 0.204611 0.078121 0.0090*** 
Size 0.980453 0.118187 0.0000*** 
Inflation 0.006051 0.004371 0.1667 
GDP -1.14E-08 3.15E-08 0.7177 
IR -0.006789 0.003895 0.0818* 
R-squared 0.955231 F-statistic 57.28632 
Adj. R-squared 0.938556 Prob (F-statistic) 0.000000 
*p=10%, **p= 5%, ***p= 1% 
 
Overall, the F-statistic in all results from the equations is significant, which indicates 
that there is a link between investment level (or CF) and one or more of the 
explanatory variables. The R-square explains between 66% and 85% of the test in 
equations 1 to 4 and 95 – 96% in equations 7 and 8. The R-square in equations 5 and 
6 is 13% and it can be concluded that the change in the investment level is not 
influenced by the change in credit ratings to such an extent as the investment level 
itself is affected. As described in Chapter 3.3.2.3. d), cross-section fixed and period 
fixed dummy variables have been used to make the results robust in all the regressions 
except those from Equation 5 and 6 (since the results were robust without the need of 
using these dummy variables).    
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5. Analysis 
The conducted regressions show that downgrades have significant influence only on 
CF levels and the correlation is negative. This means that the lower the credit rating 
becomes, the less CF is available for investing in a firm and this influences the 
investment decisions of the company. Having in mind the consistent results that CF 
level is the major determinant of the investment level and that there is a significant 
negative correlation between downgrades and CF, it could be concluded that 
companies in the emerging markets (as outlined in the theoretical framework) indeed 
rely more on internal financing and CRAs are not as important market participants as 
they are in the developed markets. This could imply that CRAs would not face the 
same scrutiny in the emerging markets as they do in the developed ones, which may 
also imply that CRAs may not be so concerned about their reputation and therefore, 
they may have less incentive to give higher ratings. In this way, the credit ratings may 
be more accurate and there would be fewer agency issues.  
 
Unlike previous research on developed markets, this research on emerging markets 
did not lead to significant overall correlation between credit rating changes and 
investment decisions. As a whole, consistent with previous research, downgrades 
seem to have stronger effect on investment level and CF, while upgrades do not incur 
such strong results. However, determinants of credit ratings such as leverage, firm 
size and profitability, do show some significant effects on the dependent variables. 
This still does not imply that credit rating changes influence the investment level of 
companies. 
 
Overall, it can be seen from the above shown results that credit rating downgrades are 
negatively correlated to investment level and CF and positively correlated to the 
changes of the investment levels, while upgrades are negatively correlated to 
investment level and positively correlated to the level of CF and the changes in the 
investment levels. This means that firms have less investment after a change in their 
credit rating irrespective of whether it is a downgrade or upgrade. Therefore, it can be 
concluded that, firms are cautious with their investment no matter if the rating change 
is positive or negative, since the signal to the market can be mixed. As for the 
correlation between the changes in investment level and credit ratings transitions, the 
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positive relationship means that there are more changes in investment level with the 
credit rating changes. This is consistent with Bannier et. al. (2012) who show that 
managers have an interest in pursuing their target rating level via capital structure 
choices and also via capital expenditures. It may hence be conceivable that a rating 
change brings the firm’s rating level further away from its target level, so that the firm 
tries to offset this move by in- or decreasing its investment rate. Even if there are 
associations between the credit rating changes and capital investments, it does not 
mean that it is the credit rating changes that drive the investment adjustments. An 
alternative explanation is that the credit rating upgrades/downgrades usually are 
followed by better performance, which may lead to higher investments in the future 
(Gul et. al., 2009). 
 
To investigate the first research question whether credit ratings influence the 
investment level of companies after rating change, regressions where the investment 
level is the dependent variable were run. Looking at the results of these regressions, 
they showed that the level of CF in the firm seems to be the most important 
determinant (positive correlation). Following the pecking order theory, the result that 
the higher the CF, the higher the investment level seems logical since the more CF a 
firm has, the more it will use it to invest and will avoid using external financing such 
as debt and equity, which may be unavailable for companies in the emerging markets 
due to greater credit risk and lower credit ratings (speculative grade).  
 
Another determinant that appears to be significant is the size of the firm which is 
negatively correlated with the investment level of the firm. At first consideration, this 
result does not seem logical since smaller firms do not have the resources or the 
access to resources to invest more than bigger firms. But at second consideration, 
having in mind that the research is conducted on companies in the emerging markets, 
it can be concluded that the majority of companies in these markets are smaller ones 
compared to the ones in the developed markets and even smaller companies have the 
incentive to invest more in order to survive the challenges of the emerging markets.  
 
Other determinants that matter are the leverage of the firm (negative correlation) and 
the inflation (positive correlation). The negative correlation between leverage and 
investment level can be interpreted so that the higher the leverage, the smaller the 
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amount of investment. This result is consistent with previous studies on leverage and 
investment such as Lang et. al. (1996) and Aivazian et. al. (2005). Emerging markets, 
as described in the theoretical framework of this study, are the fastest growing 
markets nowadays, which lead to the conclusion that companies in these markets have 
high growth opportunities. Despite that fact, previous research finds that firms with 
large debt commitments invest less irrespective of the nature of their growth 
opportunities (Lang et. al., 1996). That is why, a negative empirical relation between 
leverage and investment may arise even in regressions that control for growth 
opportunities because managers reduce leverage in anticipation of future investment 
opportunities (Aivazian et. al., 2005).  Myers (1977) argued that leverage could have 
a negative effect on investment because of an agency problem between shareholders 
and bondholders. If managers work in the interest of shareholders, they may give up 
some positive net present value projects due to debt overhang. The theory of Jensen 
(1986) also suggests a negative relationship between leverage and investment, but his 
arguments are based on agency conflicts between managers and shareholders. He 
argues that firms with free cash flow but low growth opportunities may invest (that is, 
overinvest) in projects with negative net present value. However, this strategy is 
costly to managers, especially if the capital market takes into account the potential 
opportunism. Therefore, managers have the incentive to pre-commit and increase 
leverage and pay out cash as interest and principal (Aivazian et. al., 2005). These 
theories suggest a negative relationship between leverage and investment. Therefore, 
the results in this study are consistent with the above described results from other 
studies.  
 
Inflation is positively related to investment level, meaning that the higher the 
inflation, the higher the investment level. Since inflation discourages savings due to 
the fact that money is worth more at present than in the future, logically there will be 
more investments. On the other hand, the result seems illogical since less savings 
reduce the economic growth because the economy needs a certain level of savings to 
finance investments which boost economic growth. It should be kept in mind that 
inflation will not persist unless accompanied by sustained increase in money supply 
since it is a monetary phenomenon (Miller & VanHoose, 2003). The uncertainty 
associated with inflation increases the risk related to investment and production 
activity of firms and markets since firms find it difficult to decide how much to 
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produce due to the inability to predict the demand for their products. Nevertheless, the 
positive correlation between inflation and investment level in this study may be 
explanatory and correct because the companies in the sample are from the emerging 
markets, where high inflation is something that countries in these markets face at a 
daily basis and more or less they have adapted to this phenomenon.  
 
To investigate the second research question whether credit ratings affect the changes 
in investment levels after up-/downgrade, tests where the dependent variable is the 
change in the investment level were conducted. The major determinant of the 
investment level change is the change in CF, which is positively correlated to 
investment. This result is consistent with the results from the whole study. Another 
important determinant is the leverage level, which is negatively correlated to 
investment. As mentioned above, these results are consistent with previous research 
on the impact of leverage on investment and this makes the results from this study 
more reliable and valid. Additionally, inflation (positively correlated) also turned out 
to be major determinant of the change in investment level. These results add more 
value to the similar results from the first research question and make the research 
consistent. 
 
The regressions investigating the level of CF as dependent variable answer the third 
research question, that is, whether credit rating changes affect the cash flow levels of 
companies. Apart from the significant influence of downgrades on CF level, the 
results lead to the conclusion that the size of the firm (positively correlated) is another 
important determinant of CF, while profitability (positively correlated) and interest 
rates (negatively correlated) are also important to a certain extent.  
 
The size of the firm once again turns out to be important determinant in this study, but 
this time the size has a positive relation to the level of CF in a firm, that is, the bigger 
a firm is, the higher the level of CF will be. This result is consistent with Jensen’s free 
cash flow hypothesis and the agency cost associated with it. The result also coincides 
with the results of Bannier et. al. (2012) who find out that larger firms are able to deal 
better with exogenous shocks, as they may be equipped with higher level of CF.  
Higher level of CF is, on the other hand, associated with larger agency problems. 
Therefore, the positive relation between the level of CF of a firm and its size 
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(compared to the negative relation between the size and the investment level of a 
firm), similar to the results of Gul et. al. (2009), may be due to the fact that the 
associations between the credit rating transitions and capital investments are less 
pronounced in firms with larger agency problems. Moreover, according to Gul et. al. 
(2009) the positive sign of the variable for size is a proxy for the capital raising ability 
of the firm.  
 
According to the results of the third research question, the profitability of a firm is 
also important determinant of the level of CF. Profitability is positively related to the 
level of CF in a firm, which means that the higher the return on assets, the higher 
level of CF of a firm will be. High return on assets results from higher profits that lead 
to higher CF in turn. This result is a straightforward consequence of increased 
revenues that lead to increased level of CF that is available for investing in a firm. 
The result is also consistent with previous result from Gul et. al. (2009), who argue 
that credit rating transitions may change firms’ bargaining powers in the financial 
markets. 
  
The negative correlation between interest rates and the level of cash flow implies that 
the lower the interest rates are, the higher the level of CF in a firm will be and the 
other way around. When interest rates are high, obtaining debt becomes expensive 
and thus companies have less CF to invest since the high interest rates make it 
difficult for firms to cover their expenditures and their products become less 
competitive in the domestic and international markets. Consequently, if the interest 
rates are low, more investment takes place in the economy as a whole which is 
reflected by more production and thus more CF for investing for firms. The negative 
correlation that results in this study is consistent with the Keynesian theory of 
investment (assuming that the planned investment of a company is the CF available 
for investment). The theory focuses on the importance of interest rates in investment 
decisions and implies that a fall in the rates should decrease the cost of investment 
and, as a result, planned investment projects on the margin may become worthwhile. 
The negative relationship between investment and the interest rate is depicted in 
Figure 6. The correlation between the two variables is represented by the marginal 
efficiency capital investment (MEC) curve. A decrease in the interest rate from R1 to 
R2 incurs an expansion of the planned investment (Davidson, 2011). 
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Figure 6. The Keynesian theory of investment 
 
Source: Davidson (2011), p. 86 
 
As a whole, the coefficient estimates on the control variables CF and size are largely 
consistent with Chava & Roberts’ (2009) research examining capital expenditures, at 
least in terms of signs. Moreover, the significance of explanatory variables such as 
leverage, profitability, inflation, interest rates follow the results in Kisgen’s (2006) 
research that managers are concerned with ratings-triggered costs (benefits) to the 
firms and the effects of regulations on bond investors. 
 
5.1. Limitations 
The data in this study covers a period from 2000 to 2012. Therefore, the results of the 
study are restricted to this time frame and it is possible that they are driven by events 
such as the crisis from 2007-2008. It is also possible that the sample may not be 
homogenous due to differences in the rules and regulations between the countries that 
may affect the investment decisions of companies in different ways. Although country 
and period dummy variables have been included in this study, it should be noted that 
these variables might not have accounted for all differences and their effects on the 
investment decisions of companies.    
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6. Conclusion 
This paper examined whether credit rating changes influence the investment decisions 
of companies in the emerging markets. The study was inspired by limited previous 
research on the topic but it was also influenced by similar studies and expanded the 
empirical scope in the afore mentioned.   
 
The study was based on panel data regressions where the investment level was the 
dependent variable and it was controlled by a number of independent variables. 
Unlike previous research, this one added the change in the investment level and the 
cash flow level of firms as dependent variables. The findings suggest that credit rating 
changes do not affect the investment level of companies, while in terms of CF as 
dependent variable, downgrades have significant negative influence on CF levels, 
leading to the conclusion that companies in the emerging markets rely more on 
internally generated funds to finance their investments and CRAs do not have such an 
important role in the emerging markets as they have in the developed markets. This 
may be a signal of fewer agency issues between CRAs, investors and companies in 
the emerging markets, less incentive for assigning better ratings and thus, a higher 
accuracy of credit ratings. 
 
Apart from this result, variables such as leverage, firm size and profitability are 
important determinants of investment decisions. Firms have less investment 
immediately after a change in their credit rating irrespective of whether it is 
downgrade or upgrade but the results suggest that credit rating upgrades/downgrades 
are followed by better performance, which may lead to higher investments in the 
future. In addition, CF turns out to be a major determinant of the investment level of 
companies with a positive correlation, strengthening the conclusion that companies in 
the emerging markets rely less on external financing (due to its unavailability or 
inaccessibility because of higher implied credit risk) and rely more on internal 
financing which they use for their investment decisions. The findings also suggest that 
global factors such as inflation and interest rates play an important role in the 
investment decisions of companies in the emerging markets. 
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As a suggestion for further research, we propose a study that focuses on credit rating 
changes and investment decisions in the seven biggest countries in the emerging 
markets by nominal GDP, that is, China, Brazil, Russia, India, Mexico, Indonesia and 
Turkey. Further research should concentrate on the influence of more macroeconomic 
factors than only GDP, inflation and interest rates, and specific political risks and the 
adequacy of natural resources. Another suggestion is a focus on a longer time 
perspective in terms of research period (to incorporate problems in the 1990s such as 
the Asian and Mexican crisis) and wider event window (since credit rating changes 
might affect the investment decisions of a company in a longer period than two years 
after the transition).  Moreover, it would be valuable to conduct the current empirical 
model using credit ratings from another CRA (e.g. Moody’s or Fitch) and see if there 
are any differences between the impacts of rating considerations from different CRAs. 
Apart from the suggested studies on credit rating changes and investment decisions 
and in the light of the results of the conducted research, we believe that it is highly 
relevant also to propose a study on the question why cash flow is so important for 
companies in the emerging markets and what determines its significance.  
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Appendix 
Appendix 1: List of companies in the sample 
Issuer Name 
Foreign Long-Term 
Rating Country 
Up-down 
grading 
Abu Dhabi National Energy Co. PJSC A United Arab Emirates u 
AEI BB- Cayman Islands u 
AES Gener S.A. BBB- Chile u 
ALCOA Aluminio S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
Aldar Properties PJSC B+ United Arab Emirates d 
Alrosa OJSC BB- Russia d 
Amazonia Celular S.A. BB+ Brazil u 
America Movil S.A.B. de C.V. A- Mexico u 
Aracruz Celulose S.A. BB Brazil d 
ASAT Holdings Ltd. D Hong Kong d 
Asia Aluminum Holdings Ltd. D China d 
Atrium European Real Estate Ltd. BBB- Jersey u 
Avago Technologies Finance Pte. Ltd. BBB- Singapore u 
Axiata Group Bhd. BBB Malaysia u 
Axtel S.A.B. de C.V. B- Mexico d 
Baoshan Iron & Steel Co. Ltd. A- China u 
Bavaria, S.A. BB+ Colombia u 
Bharti Airtel Ltd. BB+ India u 
BorsodChem Rt B+ Hungary d 
Braskem S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
BRF Brasil Foods S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
Camuzzi Gas Pampeana S.A. CCC- Argentina d 
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Carnival Corp. BBB+ Panama u 
C.A. La Electricidad De Caracas B- Venezuela d 
C.N. Transelectrica S.A. BB+ Romania u 
Central Telecommunications Co. (OJSC) BB Russia u 
CESP-Companhia Energetica de Sao Paulo BB Brazil u 
Chaoda Modern Agriculture (Holdings) Ltd. CC China d 
Cheung Kong (Holdings) Ltd. A- Hong Kong d 
China Forestry Holdings Co. Ltd. CCC- Cayman Islands d 
China Fishery Group Ltd. B+ Hong Kong u 
China Glass Holdings Ltd. B+ China u 
China Lumena New Materials Corp. B+ Cayman Islands d 
China Medical Technologies Inc. D China d 
China Mobile Ltd. AA- Hong Kong u 
China Petroleum & Chemical Corp. A+ China u 
China SCE Properties Group Ltd. B- Cayman Islands d 
Chinese Estates Holdings Ltd. B+ Hong Kong d 
Chunghwa Telecom Co. Ltd. AA Taiwan d 
CITIC Pacific Ltd. BB+ Hong Kong u 
CLP Holdings Ltd. A- Hong Kong u 
CNOOC Ltd. AA- Hong Kong u 
Coca Cola Embonor S.A. BB+ Chile d 
Coca-Cola Femsa S.A.B. de C.V. A- Mexico u 
Comision Federal De Electricidad BBB Mexico u 
Companhia de Saneamento Basico do Estado de Sao Paulo BB+ Brazil u 
Companhia Siderurgica Nacional BBB- Brazil u 
Compania Anonima Nacional Telefonos de Venezuela B- Venezuela u 
Compania de Petroleos de Chile COPEC S.A. BBB Chile d 
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Compania de Transporte de Energia Electrica en Alta Tension 
TRANSENER S.A. CCC Argentina d 
Compania General de Electricidad S.A. BR Chile d 
Compania Sud Americana de Vapores B- Chile d 
Comstar United TeleSystems (JSC) BB Russia u 
Copamex S.A. de C.V. B+ Mexico d 
Corporacion Durango, S. A. B. de C. V. D Mexico d 
Corporacion GEO S.A.B. de C.V. BB- Mexico d 
Corporacion Interamericana de Entretenimiento, S. A. B. de C. V. y 
Subsidiarias CCC Mexico u 
Cosan S.A. Industria e Comercio BB Brazil d 
Country Garden Holdings Co. Ltd. BB Cayman Islands d 
Cyfrowy Polsat S.A. BB- Poland u 
Cyrela Brazil Realty S.A. Empreendimentos e Participacoes BB Brazil d 
Datang International Power Generation Co. Ltd. BBB- China d 
Desarrolladora Homex S.A.B. de C.V. B+ Mexico d 
Desc Automotriz, S.A. de C.V. B+ Mexico d 
Diagnosticos da America S.A. BB Brazil u 
Dogus Holding A.S. BB Turkey u 
DP World Ltd. BB United Arab Emirates d 
Duke Energy International Geracao Paranapanema S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
Ecopetrol S.A. BBB- Colombia u 
Electricity Generating Authority of Thailand BBB+ Thailand u 
Eletrobras-Centrais Eletricas Brasileiras S.A. BBB Brazil u 
Emaar Properties PJSC BB United Arab Emirates d 
Emirates Telecommunications Corp. (Etisalat) AA- United Arab Emirates u 
Empresa Distribuidora Y Comercializadora Norte S.A. CCC- Argentina d 
Empresa Nacional de Electricidad S.A. Chile BBB+ Chile u 
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Empresas Iansa S.A. B+ Chile u 
Empresas ICA S.A.B. de C.V. BB- Mexico u 
Energisa S.A. BB Brazil u 
Energisa Sergipe-Distribuidora de Energia S.A. BB Brazil d 
Enersis S.A. BBB+ Chile u 
ENN Energy Holdings Ltd. BBB- Cayman Islands u 
Eregli Demir ve Celik Fabrikalari T.A.S. B Turkey d 
Eurasian Natural Resources Corp. PLC BB- Kazakhstan d 
Evraz Group S.A. B+ Russia d 
Far EasTone Telecommunications Co. Ltd. A- Taiwan u 
Fibria Celulose S.A. BB+ Brazil d 
Federal Grid Co. of the Unified Energy System BBB Russia u 
Formosa Chemicals & Fibre Corp. BBB+ Taiwan u 
Formosa Petrochemical Corp. BBB+ Taiwan u 
Formosa Plastics Corp. BBB+ Taiwan u 
Franshion Properties (China) Ltd. BB+ Hong Kong d 
G Steel Public Co. Ltd. D Thailand d 
Gazprom Neft JSC BBB- Russia u 
Gazprom OAO BBB Russia u 
Genting Bhd. BBB+ Malaysia d 
Gerdau S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
GITI Tire Pte. Ltd. B- China d 
Globe Telecom Inc. BB+ Philippines u 
Golden Telecom Inc. BB+ Russia u 
Grupo Bimbo S.A.B. de C.V. BBB Mexico u 
Grupo Iusacell S.A. de C.V. D Mexico d 
Grupo KUO S.A.B. de C.V. BB Mexico u 
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Grupo Televisa S.A.B. BBB+ Mexico u 
Grupo TMM, S. A. B. B- Mexico u 
HannStar Display Corp. B Taiwan d 
Herbalife Ltd. BB+ Cayman Islands u 
Hidroelectrica Piedra del Aguila S.A. B- Argentina d 
Hon Hai Precision Industry Co. Ltd. A- Taiwan u 
Hongkong Land Holdings Ltd. A- Hong Kong u 
Huaneng Power International Inc. BBB China d 
Hutchison Whampoa Ltd. A- Hong Kong d 
Impsat Fiber Networks Inc. D Argentina d 
Indian Oil Corp. Ltd. BB+ India d 
Industrias Penoles S.A.B. de C.V. BBB Mexico u 
Infosys Ltd. BBB+ India u 
Irkutskenergo, AO EiE B- Russia d 
JBS S.A. BB Brazil u 
Kaisa Group Holdings Ltd. B+ Cayman Islands d 
Kazakhtelecom JSC BB Kazakhstan u 
Kazanorgsintez OJSC D Russia d 
Kimberly-Clark de Mexico S.A.B. de C.V. A- Mexico u 
Korea Electric Power Corp. A+ Korea, Republic Of u 
Korea Gas Corp. A+ Korea, Republic Of u 
KT&G Corp. A- Korea, Republic Of u 
Kuwait Projects Co. (Holding) K.S.C. BBB- Kuwait d 
LG Chem Ltd. A- Korea, Republic Of u 
LG Electronics Inc. BBB- Korea, Republic Of d 
LG Uplus Corp. BBB- Korea, Republic Of u 
LUKoil OAO BBB- Russia u 
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Macronix International Co. Ltd. B Taiwan d 
Magyar Telekom PLC A Hungary u 
Mitsui & Co. (Hong Kong) Ltd. A- Hong Kong u 
MMC Norilsk Nickel OJSC BBB- Russia u 
Mobile TeleSystems (OJSC) BB Russia u 
Mondi Group BBB- South Africa u 
Moscow City Telephone Network (JSC) BB Russia u 
Mosel Vitelic Inc. CCC+ Taiwan d 
Mosenergo (AO) BB Russia u 
MRS Logistica S.A. BB+ Brazil u 
MTR Corp. Ltd. AAA Hong Kong u 
Nan Ya Plastics Corp. BBB+ Taiwan d 
National Central Cooling Co. PJSC CC United Arab Emirates d 
Netia S.A. B Poland d 
NHPC Ltd. BBB- India u 
Nine Dragons Paper (Holdings) Ltd. BB China d 
North-West Telecom (JSC) BB- Russia u 
Nutrinvestholding OJSC D Russia d 
NTPC Ltd. BBB- India u 
OAO TMK B+ Russia u 
Oil Company Rosneft OJSC BBB- Russia u 
OJSC Novorossiysk Commercial Sea Port BB- Russia d 
Open Joint Stock Co. Trade House Kopeyka B+ Russia u 
Orascom Telecom Holdings S.A.E. B Egypt u 
Pabrik Kertas Tjiwi Kimia Tbk (P.T) D Indonesia d 
Parkson Retail Group Ltd. BB+ Cayman Islands u 
Pepsi-Gemex, S.A. de C.V. BBB- Mexico u 
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Petrol Ofisi A.S. BB- Turkey u 
Petroleo Brasileiro S.A. - Petrobras BBB Brazil u 
Petroleos Mexicanos BBB Mexico d 
Power Assets Holdings Ltd. A+ Hong Kong u 
PT Arpeni Pratama Ocean Line Tbk. B+ Indonesia d 
PT Berau Coal Energy BB- Indonesia u 
PT Hanjaya Mandala Sampoerna Tbk. BB+ Indonesia u 
PT Indosat Tbk. BB+ Indonesia u 
PT Matahari Putra Prima Tbk. B+ Indonesia u 
PT Mobile-8 Telecom Tbk. D Indonesia d 
PT Perusahaan Gas Negara (Persero) Tbk. BB+ Indonesia u 
PT Telekomunikasi Indonesia Tbk. BB+ Indonesia u 
PT Vale Indonesia Tbk BB+ Indonesia u 
PT XL Axiata Tbk. BB Indonesia u 
PTT Aromatics and Refining Public Co. Ltd. BBB Thailand u 
PTT Exploration and Production Public Co. Ltd. BBB+ Thailand u 
Qatar Telecom (Qtel) Q.S.C. A Qatar u 
Ranhill Bhd. B- Malaysia d 
Ratchaburi Electricity Generating Holding Public Co. Ltd. BBB+ Thailand u 
Reliance Industries Ltd. BBB India u 
Ritek Corp. B Taiwan d 
Road King Infrastructure Ltd. BB- Hong Kong d 
Rostelecom OJSC BB+ Russia u 
RusHydro (OJSC) BB+ Russia d 
Samsung Electronics Co. Ltd. A Korea, Republic Of u 
San Miguel Corp. BB- Philippines d 
Sappi Ltd. BB- South Africa d 
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Sasol Ltd. BBB South Africa d 
Satelites Mexicanos S.A. de C.V. B Mexico u 
Saudi Basic Industries Corp. A+ Saudi Arabia u 
SAZKA a.s. D Czech Republic d 
Shinsegae Co. Ltd. BBB+ Korea, Republic Of d 
Siliconware Precision Industries Co. Ltd. BB+ Taiwan u 
Singapore Post Ltd. A+ Singapore d 
Singapore Telecommunications Ltd. A+ Singapore d 
Sino-Forest Corp. CCC- China d 
Sistema (JSFC) BB Russia u 
SK Corp. BBB- Korea, Republic Of u 
SK Innovation Co. Ltd. BBB Korea, Republic Of u 
Southern Telecommunications Co. (OJSC) B+ Russia u 
Sri Lanka Telecom PLC B+ Sri Lanka d 
STATS ChipPAC Ltd. BB+ Singapore u 
Tata Consultancy Services Ltd. BBB+ India u 
Tata Power Co. Ltd. BB- India d 
Tata Steel Ltd. BB India u 
Telecom Argentina S.A. B- Argentina d 
Telefonica de Argentina S.A. B Argentina u 
Telefonica Holding de Argentina S.A. B+ Argentina u 
Telefonos de Mexico S.A.B. de C.V. A- Mexico u 
Telekom Malaysia Bhd. A- Malaysia u 
Telemar Norte Leste S.A. BBB- Brazil u 
Telemig Celular S.A. BB Brazil u 
Titan Petrochemicals Group Ltd. CC Hong Kong d 
TNK-BP International Ltd. BBB- Russia u 
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Total Access Communication Public Co. Ltd. BB+ Thailand u 
TOM Group Ltd. BB- Hong Kong d 
Towngas China Co. Ltd. BBB Cayman Islands u 
Turkcell Iletisim Hizmetleri A.S. BB+ Turkey u 
TVN S.A. B+ Poland d 
Universal Robina Corp. BB Philippines u 
Uralsvyazinform (OJSC) BB- Russia u 
Vale S.A. A- Brazil u 
Vestel Elektronik Sanayi Ve Ticaret A.S. B- Turkey d 
Vimpel-Communications JSC BB Russia d 
Vitro S.A.B. de C.V. D Mexico d 
VolgaTelecom (OJSC) BB Russia u 
Wan Hai Lines Ltd. BB+ Taiwan d 
Wimm-Bill-Dann Foods OJSC BB+ Russia u 
Xignux S.A. de C.V. BB+ Mexico u 
Xinhua Finance Ltd. B- China d 
YPF  S.A. B+ Argentina d 
YTL Power International Bhd. BBB Malaysia u 
Zapadoceska Energetika a.s. BBB+ Czech Republic d 
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Appendix 2: Country representation of companies 
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Appendix 3: Correlation matrix 
         
Correlation        
t-Statistic        
Probability CAPEX_PPE  DEBT_TOT_CAPITAL  EBITDA_TOT_ASSETS  GDP  INFLATION  IR  LOG_CF  RATING_CHANGE  
CAPEX_PPE  1.000000        
 -----         
 -----         
         
DEBT_TOT_CAPITAL  -0.003647 1.000000       
 -0.107953 -----        
 0.9141 -----        
         
EBITDA_TOT_ASSETS  0.053352 -0.090594 1.000000      
 1.581316 -2.692402 -----       
 0.1142 0.0072 -----       
         
GDP  -0.046717 0.035449 -0.012378 1.000000     
 -1.384218 1.049851 -0.366395 -----      
 0.1666 0.2941 0.7142 -----      
         
INFLATION  -0.063724 0.026813 0.060759 -0.141063 1.000000    
 -1.889893 0.793879 1.801639 -4.217248 -----     
 0.0591 0.4275 0.0719 0.0000 -----     
         
IR  0.011985 -0.011380 0.106409 -0.083237 0.295403 1.000000   
 0.354752 -0.336842 3.167406 -2.472176 9.151539 -----    
 0.7229 0.7363 0.0016 0.0136 0.0000 -----    
         
LOG_CF  0.093943 -0.024697 0.033072 -0.208130 -0.165643 -0.139157 1.000000  
 2.792821 -0.731188 0.979374 -6.298007 -4.971251 -4.159136 -----   
 0.0053 0.4649 0.3277 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----   
         
RATING_CHANGE  -0.033840 -0.226650 0.068466 -0.061057 -0.267289 -0.268221 0.303085 1.000000 
 -1.002149 -6.887463 2.031171 -1.810499 -8.209731 -8.240587 9.413262 -----  
 0.3165 0.0000 0.0425 0.0706 0.0000 0.0000 0.0000 -----  
         
          
 
 
 
        
 
